Hardness of Samples Is All You Need: Protecting Deep Learning Models
  Using Hardness of Samples by Sadeghzadeh, Amir Mahdi et al.
Hardness of Samples Is All You Need:
Protecting Deep Learning Models Using Hardness of Samples
Amir Mahdi Sadeghzadeh
Sharif University of Technology
amsadeghzadeh@ce.sharif.edu
Faezeh Dehghan
Sharif University of Technology
dehghanniri@ce.sharif.edu
Amir Mohammad Sobhanian
Sharif University of Technology
amsobhanian@ce.sharif.edu
Rasool Jalili
Sharif University of Technology
jalili@sharif.edu
Abstract
Several recent studies have shown that Deep Neural Network
(DNN)-based classifiers are vulnerable against model extrac-
tion attacks. In model extraction attacks, an adversary ex-
ploits the target classifier to create a surrogate classifier im-
itating the target classifier with respect to some criteria. In
this paper, we investigate the hardness degree of samples and
demonstrate that the hardness degree histogram of model ex-
traction attacks samples is distinguishable from the hardness
degree histogram of normal samples. Normal samples come
from the target classifier’s training data distribution. As the
training process of DNN-based classifiers is done in several
epochs, we can consider this process as a sequence of sub-
classifiers so that each subclassifier is created at the end of
an epoch. We use the sequence of subclassifiers to calcu-
late the hardness degree of samples. We investigate the rela-
tion between hardness degree of samples and the trust in the
classifier outputs. We propose Hardness-Oriented Detection
Approach (HODA) to detect the sample sequences of model
extraction attacks. The results demonstrate that HODA can
detect the sample sequences of model extraction attacks with
a high success rate by only watching 100 attack samples. We
also investigate the hardness degree of adversarial examples
and indicate that the hardness degree histogram of adversar-
ial examples is distinct from the hardness degree histogram
of normal samples.
1 Introduction
Deep Neural networks (DNNs) have shown impressive per-
formance in various tasks in recent years that have encour-
aged the industry to deploy DNN-based models in a vari-
ety of real-world applications. Since the training process of
DNNs and collecting training data is an expensive and te-
dious process, models are considered the intellectual prop-
erty of organizations, and they must be kept secure. There-
fore, models are often securely deployed on cloud servers
and only the creators can access to the models’ parame-
ters. Users are only allowed to query the model via a
prediction API and receive the prediction. Recent studies
[22, 25, 39, 44, 52] demonstrate that an adversary can use the
prediction API to extract a target model and create a surro-
gate classifier that imitates the target classifier with respect to
some criteria, such as accuracy and fidelity. Such attacks are
called model extraction attacks, and they violate the intellec-
tual property of model creators. Furthermore, the surrogate
classifier can be used to conduct other attacks on the target
classifier in the black-box setting, such as adversarial exam-
ple attacks [25, 44] and membership inference attacks [49].
Most of the model extraction attacks exploit the target
classifier to label an unlabeled dataset to create the surro-
gate classifier’s training set [22,25,39,44,52]. There are two
main approaches to defense against model extraction attacks,
perturbing the target classifier’s outputs [27, 28, 35, 40] and
detecting the sample sequences of attacks [25, 29]. To the
best of our knowledge, PRADA [25] is the only approach at-
tempting to detect the sample sequences of model extraction
attacks on DNN-based classifiers. Other defenses perturb the
outputs of target classifier to decrease the surrogate classifier
performance. The methods assume that the outputs of tar-
get classifier is probability vectors, and the adversary uses
these probability vectors as the labels of the surrogate classi-
fier’s training data. These methods are not applicable to tasks
that are sensitive to the actual values of the target classifier
outputs, such as medical applications. Besides, when the ad-
versary uses the argmax of the target classifier’s output, they
have to decrease the accuracy of target classifier to reduce
the performance of surrogate classifier.
In this paper, we propose Hardness-Oriented Detection
Approach (HODA), a new approach to detect sample se-
quences of model extraction attacks. It outperforms PRADA
[25] by a large margin and has significantly less computa-
tional overhead. Generally, the training process of DNNs is
done in several epochs, and the resulted classifier at the end
of the last epoch is considered as the final classifier. In the
training process of the target classifier, we save the resulted
classifier at the end of each epoch and call them subclassi-























subclassifier of the ith epoch is the first subclassifier that all
subsequent epochs subclassifiers agree with the predicted la-
bel of that subclassifier. We consider the index of the epoch
in which a new sample is learned as the hardness degree of
that sample. Therefore, when a sample is learned in the early
epochs, the hardness degree of that sample is low, and when
a sample is learned in the late epochs, the hardness degree of
that sample is high.
We call samples that come from the target classifier’s
training data distribution as normal samples, and demon-
strate that the hardness degree histogram of normal samples
is very distinct from the hardness degree histogram of model
extraction attacks’ samples. HODA uses this property to de-
tect model extraction attacks. HODA only uses 11 subclassi-
fiers to determine the hardness degree of samples. For each
user, HODA calculates the distance between the hardness de-
gree histograms of the user’s samples and normal samples,
and if the distance is greater than a threshold, the user is an
adversary.
HODA can detect JBDA [44], JBRAND [25], and Knock-
off Net [39] attacks with a high success rate by only watch-
ing 100 samples of attack. We demonstrate that HODA is
also very effective when the target classifier is trained using
transfer learning. We also indicate that the hardness degree
histogram of adversarial examples [6, 9, 14, 37, 50] is dis-
tinct from the hardness degree histogram of normal samples.
Hence, although HODA can not detect a single adversarial
example, it can detect sample sequences that the whole or a
fraction of them is adversarial examples with a high success
rate. We also show the application of hardness degree in de-
termining the trust in the classifiers’ outputs. It is indicated
as the hardness degree of a normal sample is increased, the
probability of misclassification of that sample is raised.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We define the hardness degree of samples and show that
the hardness degree of samples is relatively transferable
among various DNNs’ architectures.
• We show that the hardness degree can be considered as
a measure of trust in the outputs of DNN-based classi-
fiers.
• We demonstrate that the performance of model extrac-
tion attacks on harder normal samples is lower than eas-
ier ones.
• We demonstrate that the hardness degree histogram of
normal samples is distinct from the hardness degree his-
tograms of model extraction attacks samples and adver-
sarial examples.
• We propose HODA to detect the sequence of model ex-
traction attacks’ samples. HODA outperforms PRADA
[25] by a large margin. We also show that HODA can
detect a sequence of samples that includes adversarial
examples.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Deep Neural Networks (DNNs)
A Deep Neural Network (DNN)-based classifier is a hierar-
chical function f : X → Y that maps the input space X to the
output space Y . DNNs have multiple layers that each layer
includes an affine transformation followed up by a non-linear
function called activation function. Each DNN has a parame-
ter set θ being tuned during the training process to minimize
the loss function L on the training set X. The training set
X= {(xi,yi)}Ni=1 consists of N pairs that each pair includes a
sample xi ∈Rd and the corresponding label yi ∈ [K], where d
is the input’s dimension, and K is the number of classes. The
output of classifier ŷi = f (xi) is a probability vector over K
classes. The jth element of ŷi indicates the classifier’s confi-
dence that xi belongs to the jth class. Hence, the label of data
xi is argmax( f (xi)). The loss function L is used to calcu-
late the distance between label yi and the output of classifier
ŷi = f (xi) for sample xi. The minimization of loss function L
is usually done using some common versions of the Stochas-
tic Gradient Descent (SGD). SGD is an iterative algorithm
that initializes the classifier’s parameters randomly and then
takes a step in the inverse direction of the gradient of loss
function with respect to the classifier’s parameters in each
iteration.




where ηt is learning rate that regulates the size of steps and is
often scheduled to be decreased during the training process.
Most often, SGD is run for multiple epochs. All samples in
the training set are shuffled and then are partitioned into sev-
eral mini-batches in each epoch. SGD uses each mini-batch
to calculate loss function and updates classifier’s parameters
for one step. There are some heuristic methods that deter-
mine the number of epochs. However, the number of train-
ing epochs is often considered as a hyperparameter and it is
determined before the training phase. After the training pro-
cess is done, the classifier is evaluated on unseen samples in
the training phase, which is called test set, to determine the
true performance of classifier in practice. For simplicity, we
use classifier instead of DNN-based classifier in the rest of
the paper.
2.2 Model Extraction Attacks
The model extraction attack is one of the most serious
threats against machine learning-based classifiers on remote
servers, such as Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS)
[7, 10, 25, 36, 39, 44, 52]. The adversary’s goal is to create
a surrogate classifier fs that imitates a target classifier ft on
task T . There are two primary intents for adversaries to con-
duct model extraction attacks, stealing and reconnaissance.
Stealing [10, 22, 39, 52]: Producing a classifier with high
performance is an expensive and time-consuming process
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and requires computational resources and experts. Besides,
given that DNNs need a large number of training samples,
collecting data and labeling them is a complex and costly
procedure for most tasks. Therefore, adversaries are moti-
vated to take advantage of a target classifier to reduce the cost
of creating a new classifier. The adversary’s goal in stealing
is that the surrogate model achieves high accuracy on the
task T data distribution DT [22, 39]. Hence, the adversary’s
goal is:
Maximize P(x,y)∼DT argmax( fs(x)) = y (2)
Reconnaissance [22,25,44]: The model extraction attacks
can be used to conduct other attacks in the black-box set-
ting, such as adversarial example attacks [6, 14, 37, 50] and
membership inference attacks [49]. Adversarial examples
are maliciously crafted inputs that make the target classifier
predict incorrectly. The transferability of adversarial exam-
ples empowers adversaries to create adversarial examples on
the surrogate classifier and transfer them to the target clas-
sifier [14, 44]. The membership inference attack determines
whether a sample exists in the training set of the target classi-
fier or not [49]. The adversary’s goal in reconnaissance is to
train a surrogate classifier that imitates the target classifier’s
decision boundaries. As the fidelity of surrogate classifier
to the target classifier is increased, the black-box attacks are
more successful. Similar to [22], we consider label agree-
ment among surrogate and target classifiers as the fidelity
metric on the task T data distribution DT . Hence, the adver-
sary’s goal is:
Maximize P(x,y)∼DT argmax( fs(x)) = argmax( ft(x)) (3)
Existing model extraction attacks can be categorized into
two main groups, direct extraction and learning-based ex-
traction. In direct model extraction, adversaries attempt to
extract the exact value of target classifier parameters (per-
fect fidelity) by theoretical approaches [4, 22, 46]. Albeit of
the high quality of surrogate classifiers produced by these
methods, they are futile against real-world deep classifiers
and only work against shallow NNs. Also, they often need
to send a sheer number of queries to the target classifier.
In this study, we focus on learning-based extraction attacks
[10, 22, 25, 39, 44]. In this category, adversaries exploit the
target classifier responses as labels of the surrogate classi-
fier’s unlabeled training set. The dataset being used by an
adversary to create the surrogate classifier’s training set is a
decisive factor of adversary’s strength.
2.3 Threat Model
The adversary must select a DNN architecture and create a
training set to train a surrogate classifier. We suppose that
the adversary knows the architecture, hyperparameters, and
input and output types of the target classifier. The capability
of an adversary to collect the surrogate model’s training sam-
ples can be divided into four categories based on the previous
studies.
• Same Distribution (SD) [22]: The adversary has ac-
cess to samples coming from the target model’s train-
ing samples distribution DT . Such adversaries are very
strong, and is hard to be resisted.
• Limited Access Same Distribution (LASD) [25, 44]:
The adversary has access to the limited number of sam-
ples coming from the target model’s training samples
distribution DT . Such adversaries try to augment col-
lected samples to increase the performance of the sur-
rogate classifier.
• Similar Distribution (SiD) [10, 39, 41]: The adversary
has no access to the samples from the target model’s
training data distribution DT ; however, she has access
to the natural samples whose distribution is similar to
DT . For example, Knockoff Net [39] uses ILSVRC12
dataset [11] to extract target image classifiers.
• Synthetic Data (SyD) [2, 26, 53]: The adversary nei-
ther has access to the samples of target model’s train-
ing set distribution DT nor natural samples from simi-
lar distributions. Hence, she uses synthetic samples to
create surrogate classifier’s training set. Since proposed
methods in this category must send a lot of samples (in
order of millions) to the target classifier, they are im-
practical.
We focus on LASD and SiD adversaries in this study.
3 Hardness of Samples
As mentioned in section 2.1, the training process of clas-
sifiers is done in several epochs. Hence, we can consider
a classifier’s training process as a sequence of classifiers in
which the last classifier is considered the final classifier being
deployed in practice. Suppose that the classifier ft is trained
for m epochs. The training process of classifier ft can be
represented as the following sequence:




t , ..., f
m−1
t > (4)
where f it is the classifier ft at the end of the i
th epoch. The
classifiers being created at the end of each epoch is called
subclassifiers, and the ith subclassifier f it is the classifier be-
ing created at the end of epoch i. We say sample xi is learned
in epoch e when f et is the first subclassifier that the assigned
label by f et is equal to all subsequent subclassifiers. Gener-
ally, as the number of epochs is increased, the performance
of classifier ft is improved. Hence, when a sample is learned
in the early epochs, we consider it as a easy sample, and
when it is learned in higher epochs, we consider it as a harder
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Figure 1: The hardness degree histograms of CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 test samples on DenseNet121, ResNet18, and MobileNet
classifiers.
Table 1: Accuracy of various classifiers on CIFAR10 and
CIFAR100 test sets.
Acc(%) ResNet18 DenseNet121 MobileNet
CIFAR10 94.36 94.92 93.59
CIFAR100 76.38 77.57 73.47
sample. Therefore, the hardness degree of sample xi for clas-
sifier ft , which is displayed by φ ft (xi), directly relates to the
epoch number that xi is learned by ft . Hence, φ f (xi) is de-
fined as follows:
φ ft (xi) = e s.t. e ∈ [0,m−1], ∀ j ∈ [e,m−1],
argmax( f et (xi)) = argmax( f
j
t (xi)),
argmax( f et (xi)) 6= argmax( f e−1t (xi)).
(5)
The hardness degree range is dependent on the number of
subclassifiers. When we have m subclassifiers, the hardness
degree of a sample is in the range [0,m− 1]. We train three
various types of classifiers, including DenseNet121 [21],
ResNet18 [18], and MobileNet [48], on CIFAR10 and CI-
FAR100 training sets [31] for 100 epochs. The details of
datasets are presented in Appendix A. All classifiers are
trained using stochastic gradient descent with momentum
0.9 and batch size 128. The learning rate is scheduled to be
decreased in each epoch by a constant factor 0.955, so that
starts by 0.1 and finishes by 0.001. The accuracy of classi-
fiers is presented in Table 1. We save all 100 subclassifiers
in the training process of each classifier and use them to cal-
culate the hardness degree of a sample. Figure 1 shows the
hardness degree histogram of CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 test
sets for various classifiers. The figure demonstrates that a
large fraction of Cifar10 samples are easy, and many samples
are learned in the first few epochs. However, the learning of
Cifar100 samples is distributed over various epochs, and the
number of hard samples is more than Cifar10.
3.1 Hardness Transferability
We introduce hardness rank to evaluate the dependency be-
tween classifiers’ architectures and the hardness of samples.
The hardness rank of sample xi for classifier f , which is dis-
played by Ω f (xi), determines the rank of sample xi among
all samples based on the hardness degree φ f (xi). Let S is the
set of all samples, and the function sort ascending sorts all
samples based on the hardness degree. The hardness rank of
sample xi is r, if sample xi is the rth element of the sorted
sample set (sort(S)). We have:
Ω f (xi) = r s.t. sort(S)[r] = xi (6)
where sort(S)[r] is the rth element of sort(S). The hardness
rank has a direct relation with the hardness of a sample. In
order to demonstrate that the hardness of a sample is rela-
tively independent of the classifiers, we compare the hard-
ness rank of samples among multiple pairs of classifiers. For
two classifiers, when the hardness rank of a high number of
samples for one classifier is close to another one, it demon-
strates that the hardness of samples is transferable among
those classifiers.
We calculate the hardness rank of 5000 samples (randomly
selected) of CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 test sets for the classi-
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Figure 2: Hardness rank of CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 5000 test samples for various pairs of classifiers.
fiers mentioned earlier and a new ResNet18 classifier. The
new classifier is trained the same as the other classifiers.
Each plot of Figure 2 shows the hardness rank of samples for
a pair of classifiers. The first row of Figure 2 demonstrates
that the hardness rank of a high number of CIFAR10 samples
is highly correlated between each pair of classifiers. Hence,
the hardness of CIFAR10 samples is very transferable among
various classifiers. The second row of Figure 2 indicates that
the hardness rank of a high number of CIFAR100 samples
is correlated between each pair of classifiers; however, they
are not as correlated as CIFAR10 samples. Notably, when
two ResNet18 classifiers are trained in the same way, the
hardness rank of samples is not the same due to the different
initial parameters and the stochasticity of the optimization
algorithm. For both datasets, the number of samples that is
hard (hardness rank > 3000) for one classifier and is easy
(hardness rank < 2000) for another classifier is very small
and vice versa. We also investigate the correlation between
samples’ hardness degrees among pairs of classifiers in Ap-
pendix B.
We find ResNet18 architecture achieves strong perfor-
mance on both datasets at a reasonable computational cost.
Therefore, we use this architecture for the classifiers in the
rest of the paper.
3.2 Hardness-Based Trust Measure
One of the most important challenges in trustworthy machine
learning is to measure the trust in the classifier’s outputs.
It is vital to determine the magnitude of trust in the clas-
sifier’s outputs in critical and security-sensitive tasks [24].
We use the hardness degree of samples as a new measure
for estimating the trust in the classifier’s outputs. Figure 3
shows the percentage of samples being classified correctly
and wrongly in 10 ranges of hardness degrees for CIFAR10
and CIFAR100 test sets. The results demonstrate that as the
hardness degree of samples is increased, the fraction of sam-
ples being correctly classified is reduced. More than 99%
and 95% of samples being learned in the first 30 epochs
(hardness degree < 30) are correctly classified in CIFAR10
and CIFAR100 test sets, respectively. On the other side, less
than 55% and 36% of samples being learned in the last 10
epochs (hardness degree ≥ 90) are correctly classified in Ci-
far10 and Cifar100 datasets, respectively. Therefore, as the
hardness degree of a sample is increased, the magnitude of
trust in the classifier’s output for that sample is reduced. Let
the hardness degree of sample x j is h. The magnitude of
trust in the classifier’s output is equal to the percentage of
test samples being correctly classified, and their hardness de-
gree is in range R, where h ∈ R. For example, suppose that
the classifier is ResNet18 and the dataset is Cifar10, based
on Figure 3 the magnitude of trust in the classifier’s output


































































































































































Figure 3: Blue and red bars show that what percentage of test samples in each range of hardness degrees being correctly or
wrongly classified, respectively. For each range of hardness degrees, Data Fraction indicates the percentage of CIFAR10 and
CIFAR100 test samples whose hardness degrees are in that range.
4 Model Extraction Attacks
As mentioned in section 2.3, the existing model extrac-
tion attacks can be partitioned into four categories, SD,
LASD, SiD, and SyD. We consider two attacks, Jacobian-
Based Dataset Augmentation (JBDA) [44] and its improve-
ment (JBRAND) [25], in LASD category. These attacks as-
sume that the adversary has access to the limited number
of samples from the target classifier’s training data distribu-
tion called seed samples. Both attacks aim to augment seed
samples using adversarial examples to increase the fidelity
of the surrogate classifier to the target classifier. The JBDA
attack uses Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [14] attack
in multiple rounds to augment seed samples. The JBRAND
attack is proposed to improve the performance of JBDA at-
tack. It uses iterative FGSM in multiple rounds to augment
seed samples and makes targeted adversarial examples with
random targets.
The adversary in SiD category has access to natural sam-
ples from the distribution close to the target classifier’s train-
ing data distribution. Orekondy et al. [39] propose Knockoff
Net (K.Net) attack that uses large public datasets to increase
the accuracy of the surrogate classifier. K.Net attack sends
natural samples in public datasets to the target classifier and
uses the target classifier’s output as the label of the surrogate
classifier’s training set. We consider two versions of K.Net
attack, K.Net CIFARX, and K.Net TIN. The K.Net CIFARX
attack uses CIFAR100 training set to extract the target clas-
sifier being trained on CIFAR10 training set and vice versa.
K.Net TIN employs TinyImageNet [34] training set to ex-
tract target classifiers. More details about attacks and their
implementations are presented in Appendix C.
4.1 Model Extraction Attacks Evaluation
All mentioned attacks create the surrogate classifier train-
ing set Xs = {(xi, ft(xi))}Bi=1 by various methods, where B
is the attack budget. The attack budget determines the num-
ber of samples that an adversary sends to the target classifier
and receives their associated outputs. After creating Xs, all
attacks train a surrogate classifier fs on Xs. Previous stud-
ies [39, 44] demonstrate that surrogate classifier’s architec-
ture has a low impact on the performance of model extraction
attacks. Hence, we consider the architecture and the training
process of surrogate classifiers as the same as the architec-
ture and the training process of target classifiers.
To evaluate the performance of model extraction attacks,
we use two ResNet18 classifiers being trained on CIFAR10
and CIFAR100 training sets as the target classifiers and con-
duct all four attacks on them. The output type of target clas-
sifiers can be different, such as label, label confidence, top-
k value in probability vector, and entire probability vector.
We only consider label and entire probability vector as the
output type of target classifiers in our experiments. The de-
fault value of the attack budget in our experiments is 50000
(B=50K). We evaluate the accuracy and the fidelity of a sur-
rogate classifier on the test set of the target classifier dataset.
Table 2 shows the accuracy and the fidelity of various
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Figure 4: The accuracy and the fidelity of four model extraction attack surrogate classifiers on both target classifiers CIFAR10
and CIFAR100 over various hardness groups. The test set of each dataset is partitioned into 10 hardness groups so that hardness
group 1 consists of the easiest samples and hardness group 10 consists of the hardest samples. The dashed lines indicate the
percentage of samples being correctly classified by both target classifier ft and surrogate classifier fs.
Table 2: The Accuracy (Acc) and the Fidelity (Fid) of sur-
rogate classifiers being created by four various model ex-
traction attacks on two target classifiers CIFAR10 and CI-
FAR100. The output type of target classifiers can be Label
or Probability Vector (Prob. Vec.).





Prob. Vec. 41.00 43.33 79.86 78.86
Label 34.57 34.35 66.88 71.29
Fid(%)
Prob. Vec. 41.16 43.63 81.36 80.18





Prob. Vec. 16.44 18.78 51.09 60.36
Label 8.62 8.07 23.20 32.88
Fid(%)
Prob. Vec. 16.90 19.13 54.59 64.90
Label 8.91 8.29 24.72 34.58
attacks on two target classifiers. The results demonstrate
that K.Net attacks have significantly better performance than
jacobian-based attacks (JBDA and JBRAND), and when the
output of target classifiers is probability vector, the perfor-
mance of attacks is considerably increased. The performance
of K.Net CIFARX and K.Net TIN are close to each other on
CIFAR10 target classifier; however, K.Net TIN has better
performance on CIFAR100 target classifier. An interesting
observation is that the fidelity and the accuracy of various at-
tacks are close together. We suppose the output type of target
classifiers is probability vector in the rest of the paper.
4.2 Hardness Analysis of Attacks
To give new insight into model extraction attacks, we investi-
gate the performance of model extraction attacks on samples
that have various levels of hardness. For this purpose, the
test sets of CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 datasets are partitioned
into 10 hardness groups based on samples’ hardness degree.
The hardness group i consists of samples that their hardness
degree is in range [i×10,(i+1)×10]. Hence, the first hard-
ness group consists of the easiest samples, and the last hard-
ness group consists of the hardest ones. Figure 4 shows the
accuracy and the fidelity of attacks over 10 hardness groups
when the output of target classifier is a probability vector.
We also replicate this experiment when the output of target
classifier is only label, and the results are presented in Ap-
pendix D. The results demonstrate that the accuracy and the
fidelity of all attacks are decreased as the hardness of sam-
ples is increased. We knew from Figure 3 that the accuracy
of target classifiers is decreased by increasing the hardness of
samples, and Figure 4 indicates the surrogate classifiers also
have the same behavior. Nevertheless, the results demon-
strate that the accuracy of K.Net attacks (specially K.Net
TIN) is close to the target classifier accuracy on the first two
hardness groups, and then, the distance between the accuracy
of target classifiers and surrogate classifiers is increased.
An intriguing observation is that the accuracy of the K.Net
surrogate classifiers approaches the accuracy of target clas-
sifiers on the last two hardness groups. To investigate this
observation, Figure 4 shows the percentage of samples be-
ing classified correctly by both surrogate classifier and tar-
get classifier for all attacks over various hardness groups
with dashed lines. The results demonstrate that all sam-
ples correctly classified by surrogate classifiers are also cor-
rectly classified by target classifiers in the first two hardness
groups. However, by increasing the hardness of samples,
the surrogate classifiers correctly classify some samples that
are not correctly classified by the target classifier, and the
number of such samples is increased by increasing the hard-
ness of samples. Jagielski et al. [22] demonstrate that labels
from the target classifier are more informative than dataset
labels. We think the information in the labels that come from
the target model causes the surrogate classifiers to correctly
classify hard samples that are not correctly classified by the
target classifier.
The fidelity of all surrogate classifiers is decreased by in-
creasing the hardness of samples, which means that the dis-
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agreement among surrogate classifiers and target classifiers
is raised on harder samples. Therefore, the outputs of target
classifier for harder samples have more information about
the target classifier for attackers than easier ones. Another
intriguing observation is that the fidelity of surrogate classi-
fiers to the target classifiers on correctly classified samples
by target classifiers is much more than wrongly classified
samples.
5 Hardness-Oriented Detection Approach
We propose a new method to detect sample sequences of
model extraction attacks, based on the distinction among
the hardness of normal and attack samples called Hardness-
Oriented Detection Approach (HODA). HODA uses the
hardness degree histogram of samples to detect model ex-
traction attacks. Figure 5 depicts the hardness degree his-
togram of 50000 samples being generated by various attacks
for CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 target classifiers. In this exper-
iment, the architecture of target and surrogate classifiers is
ResNet18. We also present the hardness degree histogram of
attacks’ samples when the architecture of target classifiers is
Densenet121 in Appendix E. Figure 5 demonstrates that the
samples generated by various attacks have a very small num-
ber of easy samples, and a majority of samples have average
and high hardness degrees. However, Figure 1 indicates that
a high number of samples from the same distribution as the
target classifier’s training set (normal samples) are easy. We
use histogram rather than hardness degree histogram in the
rest of the paper for simplicity.
HODA uses Pearson distance metric to evaluate the his-
togram of samples sent by a user to detect model extraction
attacks. Hence, HODA only keeps a histogram for each
user. Notably, HODA does not need to save samples of
each user or their hardness degree. When a new sample xi
from user u arrives, HODA calculates the hardness degree
of that sample, and the histogram belongs to that user Hu
is updated. Hence, HODA only keeps a vector of integers
that indicates the number of samples in each bin of the his-
togram. So far, 100 subclassifiers have classified each sam-
ple to create the hardness degree histograms. However, it
may not be possible to classify each sample by a high num-
ber of subclassifiers in practice. Hence, HODA only uses
11 subclassifiers to calculate the hardness degree of each
sample, and these subclassifiers are selected in the training
phase of target classifier ft at the end of each 10 epochs <




















t >. Since the
range of hardness degrees is dependent on the number of
subclassifiers being used to calculate hardness degree, the
hardness degree of a sample in HODA is in the range [0,10].
Pearson distance between two random variable X and Y is
defined as follows:
DistP(X ,Y ) = 1−ρXY (7)





where COV(X ,Y ) is the covariance between random vari-
ables X and Y , and ρX is the standard deviation of random
variable X . The output of Pearson distance is in the range
[0,2]. To calculate the Pearson distance between two his-
tograms, we first divide the number of samples in each bin of
a histogram by the total number of samples in that histogram
to transform a histogram into a probability distribution and
then calculate the Pearson distance between two probability
distributions.
HODA requires normal histogram Hn that represents the
histogram of a normal user’s samples. When the number of
samples being sent by a user reaches a specific number nums,
HODA calculates Pearson distance between the histograms
of normal samples Hn and user samples Hu. If the distance is
greater than a threshold δ, the user u is detected as an adver-
sary, or in MLaaS, the price of each query can be increased.
HODA uses normal sample set SHODA to create Hn and
calculate δ. It creates sequence set Seqnormal from SHODA
so that each sequence has nums samples and samples are
randomly selected from SHODA. Then, HODA creates a set
of hardness degree histograms called HSeqnormal through pro-
ducing a hardness degree histogram for each sequence in
Seqnormal . The normal histogram Hn is the average of all
histograms in HSeqnormal , and δ is the maximum Pearson dis-
tance between Hn and all histograms in HSeqnormal . Since δ
is independent of attacks and only relies on normal samples,
HODA is not dependent on any attacks.
5.1 Setup and Evaluation
We need two sets of normal samples to evaluate HODA,
SHODA and Su. We randomly select 40% and 60% of test
samples of each dataset for SHODA and Su, respectively. Su
is used to simulate benign users. We consider 10000 benign
users, and each benign user sends a sequence of nums sam-
ples being randomly selected from Su. We consider 40000
sequences of nums samples drawn randomly from SHODA to
create Hn and calculate δ. We simulate 10000 adversaries
for each attack to evaluate the performance of HODA against
various model extraction attacks. We have generated 50000
samples for each attack in previous experiments. For each at-
tack, the adversary sends a sequence of nums samples drawn
randomly with preserve order from 50000 samples of that
attack.
To the best of our knowledge, PRADA [25] is the only
defense that is comparable to HODA. PRADA declares that
the distribution of the minimum distance between samples of
benign users is normal. Hence, it uses the Shapiro-Wilk nor-
mality test to determine that a sequence of samples belongs
to a benign user or an adversary. Similar to HODA, PRADA
8










































































Figure 5: The hardness degree histograms of samples of four various model extraction attacks on CIFAR10 and CIFAR100
target classifiers. The budget of model extraction attacks is 50000.
Table 3: The detection rate and False Positive Rate (PFR) of
PRADA and HODA against four various model extraction
attacks. The FPR indicates the percentage of benign users’
sample sequences that are detected as the sample sequence
of model extraction attacks.
Detection Rate of Attacks(%)







100 0.929 0.15 68.0 51.3 0.2 0.1
500 0.984 0.00 96.5 100 1.9 0.3
HODA
100 0.141 0.04 100 100 100 100







100 0.923 0.00 20.8 21.0 0.0 0.0
500 0.984 0.00 99.5 99.5 0.0 0.0
HODA
100 0.263 0.05 100 100 100 100
500 0.037 0.08 100 100 100 100
also uses threshold δ to detect the sample sequences of model
extraction attacks, and δ is the only parameter of PRADA.
Since PRADA needs to save each user’s samples and calcu-
late L2 distance between them, it has a high computational
overhead.
Table 3 indicates the performance of PRADA and HODA
for both target classifiers, CIFAR10 and CIFAR100. We
evaluate PRADA and HODA when the number of a user’s
samples reaches 100 and 500 (nums = 100 and nums = 500).
False-Positive Rate (FPR) indicates the percentage of be-
nign users’ sample sequences being detected as an attack.
PRADA and HODA have very low false-positive rates. The
results demonstrate that HODA is very effective against
model extraction attacks, and it outperforms PRADA. Since
knockoff Net attacks [39] use natural samples, PRADA can
not detect them. However, HODA can detect knockoff Net
attacks. HODA also has better performance on jacobian-
based attacks than PRADA. HODA can detect all attacks on
the CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 target classifiers by just watch-
ing 100 samples from an adversary, respectively.
5.2 Transfer Learning
Transfer learning is a machine learning technique that ini-
tializes the parameters of the target task classifier using the
parameters of a trained source task classifier. The target task
classifier uses the knowledge in the pre-trained classifier and
attempts to tune the parameters of the pre-trained classifier
to adapt to the target task domain. Many studies have shown
that the DNN’s layers trained on a source task with a large-
scale labeled dataset can be used as starting point of a target
task classifier having substantially less available data [42].
We train two new target classifiers on CUB200 [54] and Cal-
tech256 [15] datasets using transfer learning. The details of
datasets are presented in Appendix A, and the training pro-
cess of new target classifiers is the same as the CIFAR10
and CIFAR100 target classifiers (Section 3). We initialize
the parameters of target classifiers from a pre-trained Ima-
geNet [11] classifier and train all layers of target classifiers.
Notably, the last layer of target classifiers is trained from
scratch. Orekondy et al. [40] indicate that jacobian-based
model extraction attacks have very poor performance on high
dimensional datasets. Hence, we only evaluate the perfor-
mance of target classifiers against K.Net ILSVRC12. K.Net
ILSVRC12 is the Knockoff Net attack that uses ILSVRC12
[11] dataset as the surrogate classifier’s training set. The
accuracy of target classifiers and K.Net ILSVRC12 surro-
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Table 4: The accuracy of CUB200 and Caltech256 target
classifiers, and the accuracy of K.Net ILSVRC12 surrogate
classifiers on both target classifiers.
Acc(%) ft K.Net ILSVRC12
CUB200 73.7 59.3
Caltech256 77.2 72.2












































Figure 6: The first column shows the hardness degree his-
tograms of CUB200 and Caltech256 test sets on the associ-
ated target classifier. The second column indicates the hard-
ness degree histograms of samples of K.Net ILSVRC12 at-
tack on CUB200 and Caltech256 target classifiers.
gate classifiers is presented in Table 4. The budget of K.Net
ILSVRC12 is 50000, and the output of target classifiers is
a probability vector. Figure 6 depicts the hardness degree
histogram of CUB200 and Caltech256 test sets on the as-
sociated target classifier and also the hardness degree his-
togram of K.Net ILSVRC12 samples for both target classi-
fiers. The figure demonstrates that the majority number of
K.Net ILSVRC12 attack samples are hard (hardness degree
> 70), and the number of easy samples (hardness degree <
30) is very small.
We replicate the experiment of the previous section
to evaluate the performance of HODA against K.Net
ILSVRC12 attack. The parameters of the experiment are
the same as the experiment in the previous section. Table 5
shows the performance of HODA against K.Net ILSVRC12
attack on both target classifiers. The results demonstrate
that even the starting point of target classifiers’ parameters is
not random, HODA is very effective in detecting the K.Net
ILSVRC12 attack.
Table 5: The detection rate and False Positive Rate (PFR) of
HODA against K.Net ILSVRC12 attack.
Detection Rate(%)
num_s δ FPR(%) K.Net ILSVRC12
CUB200
100 0.152 0.01 100
500 0.017 0.02 100
Caltech256
100 0.393 0.02 100
500 0.076 0.02 100
6 Adversarial Examples (AEs)
Adversarial examples (AEs) are maliciously crafted inputs
that cause the target classifier to misclassify input. Gener-
ally, adversarial examples are created by adding small, of-
ten imperceptible, perturbations to normal samples to force
a classifier to predict incorrectly. Given that large perturba-
tions can change the true class of samples, the magnitude of
perturbation is often restricted by Lp-norms ‖ . ‖p. Suppose
that the label of sample x is y, adversarial example x′ can be
formulated as follows:
x′ = x+η s.t. ft(x′) = y′, y 6= y′, ‖ η ‖p≤ ε. (9)
There are numerous methods to generate adversarial ex-
amples such as L-BFGS [50], FGSM [14], C&W [6], PGD
[37], and AutoAttack (AA) [9]. Also, there are several
defenses against adversarial examples, such as adversarial
training [32, 37], adversarial example detection [16, 38], and
certified robustness [45, 55]. The defense methods com-
monly focus on creating a robust classifier or detecting a sin-
gle adversarial example. Some previous studies investigate
the performance of proposed defenses and demonstrate their
limitations [5, 33, 58]. To investigate the hardness of adver-
sarial examples, we use FGSM [14], C&W [6], PGD [37],
and AA [9] attacks to generate adversarial examples on CI-
FAR10 and CIFAR100 test sets. The adversarial examples
are created in the white-box setting, and they are untargeted.
The details of these four attacks and their implementations
are presented in Appendix F. Figure 7 indicates the hardness
degree of adversarial examples on two target classifiers CI-
FAR10 and CIFAR100. Although the distance between nor-
mal samples and adversarial examples is very small, Figure
7 demonstrates that the hardness degree histograms of adver-
sarial examples are very different from normal samples (Fig-
ure 1). Most adversarial examples being generated by FGSM
and C&W are harder than adversarial examples being gener-
ated by PGD and AA. We think this is because the size of
perturbations being added to normal samples by FGSM and
C&W is larger than PGD and AA. An intriguing observation
is that almost all adversarial examples being generated by
PGD are not hard (hardness degree > 70). AA has relatively
the same behavior, and the number of its hard adversarial
examples is very small.
It is obvious that HODA can not detect a single adver-
10














































































Figure 7: The hardness degree histograms of samples of four various adversarial example attacks on CIFAR10 and CIFAR100
target classifiers. Each attack uses 10000 natural samples in the test set associated with the target classifier dataset to create
10000 adversarial examples.
sarial example. However, there are situations that an ad-
versary sends several samples to the target classifier that
a fraction of which is adversarial examples. For example,
when an adversary wants to send spam emails to several
victims or send several malicious network flows to various
receivers, she must generate several adversarial examples
to evade DNN-based spam detectors [13] or network traf-
fic classifiers [47]. In these situations, HODA can be used to
separate adversaries from benign users. To evaluate HODA
in this setting, we replicate the experiments performed to de-
tect model extraction attacks; however, rather than an adver-
sary sends samples of model extraction attacks, she sends a
set of samples that a fraction of them is adversarial exam-
ples and the rest of them is normal samples. We consider
four scenarios in which 10%, 25%, 50%, and 100% of an
adversary’s samples are adversarial examples. We suppose a
defender can monitor samples that each user sends to the tar-
get classifier. Table 6 indicates the performance of HODA in
four mentioned scenarios for CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 tar-
get classifiers, when HODA only watches 100 or 500 sam-
ples of each user (nums = 100 and nums = 500). Notably,
Since HODA only dependent on the histogram of normal
samples, we use the same δ that we used to detect model
extraction attacks. AE percentage indicates what percent-
age of adversaries’ sample sequences are adversarial exam-
ples. For CIFAR10 target classifier, when AE percentage is
more than 50%, HODA has a high detection rate by only
watching 100 samples of sequences, and when AE percent-
age is 25%, it needs to watch 500 samples of sequences to
detect attacks’ sequences with a high success rate. For CI-
FAR100 target classifier, the performance of HODA against
FGSM and C&W attacks is similar to CIFAR10 target classi-
fier; however, HODA performs relatively poor against PGD
and AA attacks. We indicate that the performance of HODA
against PGD and AA attacks considerably improves when
HODA uses 100 subclassifiers to determine the hardness de-
gree of samples in Appendix G.
7 Discussion
An adaptive adversary who is aware of HODA can poten-
tially modify her attack to evade it. Fundamentally, model
extraction attacks can evade HODA if they have access to
the samples that come from the target classifier’s training
data distribution. However, this is a strong threat model,
and in most studies, it is supposed that there is no such
access [25, 39, 44]. An adaptive adversary must send her
queries based on the hardness degree histogram of normal
samples to evade HODA. There are two reasons why such
attack is hard to conduct.
1. The adversary needs samples with various degrees of
hardness. However, since the adversary has no access to
the target classifier, she can not determine the hardness
degree of her samples for the target classifier.
2. The adversary has no access to the histogram of normal
samples to generate samples based on it.
We propose HODA to detect sample sequences of model
extraction attacks. However, some other policies can be de-
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Table 6: The detection rate and False Positive Rate (PFR)
of HODA against four various adversarial example attacks.
The FPR indicates the percentage of benign users’ sample se-
quences that are detected as sample sequences of attacks. AE
percentage indicates what percentage of adversaries’ sample
sequences are adversarial examples.
Detection Rate of Attacks(%)
AE
Percentage(%)









10 0.07 0.17 0.11 0.18
25 1.41 2.02 3.61 8.49
50 85.98 95.79 82.3 97.47




10 0.56 0.42 1.01 2.2
25 57.24 63.99 90.18 99.28
50 100 100 100 100










10 0.46 0.4 0.06 0.06
25 6.45 9.27 0.09 0.2
50 88.52 98.49 0.37 1.51




10 2.64 2.5 0.29 0.29
25 82.38 96.81 13.24 12.44
50 100 100 96.57 95.02
100 100 100 100 100
fined using the hardness degree histograms of users’ sam-
ples. For example, the price of a user’s queries can be deter-
mined based on the distance among the hardness degree his-
tograms of the user’s samples and normal samples to raise
the price of model extraction attacks in MLaaS. There are
several studies [27, 28, 35, 40] that propose to perturb the
output of the target classifier to decrease the performance
of the surrogate classifier. Our method can be mixed with
such methods. For example, the size of perturbation applied
to the output of target classifier can be related to the distance
among the hardness degree histograms of the user’s samples
and normal samples to increase the utility of perturbation-
based methods.
8 Related Works
Some recent studies investigate the dynamic of the DNNs
training process [12, 17]. Hacohen et al. [17] demonstrate
that DNNs learn samples in both the training and test sets in
a similar order. Frankle et al. [12] indicate that the DNN-
based classifiers undergo substantial changes in the first few
SGD iterations. The magnitude of gradients in the first iter-
ations is larger than the next iterations, and the sign of most
parameters is determined in the first few iterations. In the
following, we briefly review the most prominent model ex-
traction attacks and defenses presented so far.
8.1 Model Extraction Attacks
For the first time Lowd and Meek [36] demonstrate the pos-
sibility of stealing simple linear machine learning models
through only interaction with them. Tramer et al. [52] show
the feasibility of model extraction attacks on commercial
MLaaS. Papernot et al. [44] and Juuti et al. [25] investi-
gate stealing DNN-based classifiers and propose jacobian-
based model extraction attacks for creating a surrogate clas-
sifier to generate adversarial examples in the black-box set-
ting. Chandrasekaran et al. [7] explore the connection be-
tween active learning and model extraction attacks. They
implement two query synthesis active learning algorithms
to extract machine learning models, such as decision trees.
Jagielski et al. [22] exploit unlabeled samples using semi-
supervised learning to improve the performance of model
extraction attacks. Knockoff Net [39], ActiveThief [41], and
Copycat CNN [10] use a similar dataset to the target classi-
fier’s training set to create the surrogate classifier’s training
set. They employ different strategies for selecting samples
from attack datasets to extract more information from the
target classifier. Yu et al. [57] employ active learning, trans-
fer learning, and a new method for generating adversarial
examples to improve model extraction attack efficiency. A
line of studies [2, 26, 53] uses synthetic data to create the
training set of surrogate classifier. Although their methods
do not need to have access to natural samples, they send a
high number of queries to the target classifier, which makes
their methods impractical. For example, [53] and [26] send
millions of queries to extract a CIFAR10 target classifier.
While most model extraction attacks have focused on the
vulnerabilities of image classifiers, recent studies demon-
strate the vulnerability of NLP [30], Graph DNN [19], and
Reinforcement learning [8] models against model extraction
attacks. Another type of model extraction attack uses hard-
ware side-channel vulnerabilities to extract a target classi-
fier [3,20,56,60]. However, these attacks have a very strong
threat model and suppose the adversary has access to the
hardware that hosts the target classifier.
8.2 Defenses against Model Extraction At-
tacks
Existing defense methods against model extraction attacks
generally distribute into two branches: perturbation-based
and detection-based. Perturbation-based defenses [27, 28,
35, 40] attempt to prevent adversaries from producing high-
quality surrogate classifiers by adding perturbation to the
output of target classifier. These methods assume that the
output of target classifier is a probability vector, and the ad-
versary uses these probability vectors as the labels of the
surrogate classifier’s training data. These methods have two
main drawbacks. First, perturbing the probability vector may
have severe impacts on the decisions made based on the tar-
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get classifier’s output in critical applications. Second, when
the adversary uses the argmax of the target classifier’s out-
put, they have to decrease the accuracy of target classifier
to reduce the performance of surrogate classifier. Proposed
detection-based defenses [25,29] attempt to detect the occur-
rence of model extraction attacks by observing successive in-
put queries to the target classifier. Kesarwani et al. [29] pro-
pose a method to measure adversary perceived knowledge
from target classifier, but this method only works for Deci-
sion Tree models. Prada [25] is the first proposed detection-
based defense for DNN models. Prada uses the histogram of
the minimum L2-norm distance among a new sample and all
previous samples to detect model extraction attacks. Aside
from its high computational overhead, it has been shown that
Prada is unable to detect model extraction attacks when an
adversary uses natural samples [41]. Watermarking neural
networks [1, 23, 51, 59] is another type of defense against
model extraction attacks. These methods prove ownership
of a surrogate classifier instead of preventing the occurrence
of model extraction attacks.
9 Conclusions
This paper demonstrates that the hardness degree of samples
is important in trustworthy machine learning. We defined
the hardness degree of samples and demonstrated that the
hardness of a sample is relatively transferable among vari-
ous architectures of classifiers. We investigated the hardness
degree of samples of model extraction attacks and showed
that the hardness degree histogram of these samples is differ-
ent from the hardness degree histogram of normal samples.
Using this property, Hardness-Oriented Detection Approach
(HODA) can detect sample sequences of model extraction at-
tacks. It is also indicated that HODA is effective even when
the target classifier is trained using transfer learning. The
results demonstrate that HODA can detect the sample se-
quences of model extraction attacks with a high success rate
by only watching 100 samples of attacks. We indicated that
the hardness degree histogram of adversarial examples dif-
fers from the hardness degree histogram of normal samples,
and HODA can detect sample sequences partially included
by adversarial examples. We also showed that the hardness
degree could be used as a measure of trust in the output of
classifiers.
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A Datasets
CIFAR10 [31]: CIFAR-10 dataset consists of 60K 32×
32 color images in 10 classes, including airplanes, cars,
birds, cats, deer, dogs, frogs, horses, ships, and trucks. It
has 6K images per class, where 5K images is in the training
set and 1K images is in the test set.
CIFAR100 [31]: CIFAR100 dataset consists of 60K 32×
32 color images in 100 classes. It has 600 images per class,
where 500 images is in the training set and 100 images is in
the test set.
TinyImageNet [34]: TinyImageNet is a subset of
ILSVRC12 [11] dataset, and contains 200 image classes.
It has 500 training samples and 50 test samples for each
class. The size of images is 64×64. We resize all images to
32×32.
CUB200 [54]: CUB200 dataset contain 200 classes of
bird categories. It consists of about 6K training and about
6K test samples. The size of images is 224×224.
Caltech256 [15]: Caltech256 dataset contain 256 classes
of common objects categories. It consists of about 24K
training and about 6K test samples. The size of images is
224×224.
ILSVRC12 [11]: ILSVRC12 uses a subset of ImageNet
and consists of 1.2 million training images, 50,000 valida-
tion images and 100,000 test images. The dataset has 1000
classes and the size of images is 224×224.
B Hardness Degree Correlation
The Pearson correlation coefficient calculates the linear cor-






where COV(X ,Y ) is the covariance between random vari-
ables X and Y , and ρX is the standard deviation of random
variable X . The Pearson correlation coefficient ρXY is in the
range [−1,1]. When ρXY is close to one, two random vari-
ables are highly correlated which means that if one of them is
increased, the other one is increased, too, and vice versa. Ta-
ble 7 shows the Pearson correlation coefficient of CIFAR10
and CIFAR100 test samples’ hardness degree for various
pairs of classifiers. The results demonstrate that the hard-
ness degree of CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 samples are highly
correlated among various pairs of classifiers. It means that
when a sample has a high hardness degree for one classifier,
Table 7: Pearson correlation coefficient of CIFAR10 and CI-







it has a high hardness degree for other classifiers with high
probability and vice versa.
C Details of Model Extraction Attacks
Jacobian-Based Dataset Augmentation (JBDA) [44]: The
goal of JBDA attack is to increase the fidelity of the sur-
rogate classifier to the target classifier to produce adversar-
ial examples for the target classifier in the black-box setting.
The authors assume that the adversary has access to a limited
number of normal samples called seed samples. JBDA aug-
ment seed samples using adversarial examples to improve
the performance of model extraction attacks. The augmenta-
tion process is conducted in multiple rounds, and each round
has the following steps:
1. The target classifier labels the seed samples in the first
step, and these samples are added to the surrogate train-
ing set Xs. In the next steps, new perturbed samples
(Sρ+1s / Sρs ) are labeled by the target classifier and are
added to the surrogate training set Xs.
2. The surrogate classifier fs is trained on Xs.
3. The samples in the training set Xs is called sample set
Ss. For each sample in Ss, a new perturbed sample
is created according to the following equation and is
added to Ss.
Sρ+1s = Sρs ∪{x+λρ+1.sign(J fs [ ft(x)]) : x ∈ Sρs } (11)
where Sρs is the surrogate training set in round ρ, λ is
step size, and J is jacobian function.
The attack is implemented with default hyperparameters
(λ = 0.1). The seed samples are selected from the test set
of datasets. We use 50 and 10 samples of each class for the
seed samples of JBDA attack on CIFAR10 and CIFAR100
target classifiers, respectively.
Jacobian-Based Random Target (JBRAND) [25]: The
goal of JBRAND is to improve the performance of JBDA. It
perturbs each sample in multiple iterations to generate more
powerful adversarial examples and generates targeted adver-
sarial examples with random targets. We generate three ad-
versarial examples with random targets for each sample in
16
Xs and use the same seed samples as JBDA. Each sample is
perturbed in five iterations with ε = 64225×5 . The other hyper-
parameters are set by default values (λ = 64255 ).
Knockoff Net (K.Net) [39]: Knockoff Net attack fills the
surrogate classifier’s training set by natural samples from a
distribution that is close to the target classifier’s training set
distribution. The attack uses large public datasets, such as
ILSVRC12, to create the surrogate classifier’s training set.
It has two strategies to select the surrogate classifier’s train-
ing set, adaptive and random. Since the adaptive strategy has
very marginal benefits, we only consider random strategy.
Knockoff Net randomly selects a subset of a public dataset
and feeds the target classifier by these samples. It uses the
outputs of the target classifier as the labels of samples in the
surrogate classifier’s training set (Xs = {(xi, ft(xi))}Bi=1). Fi-
nally, it uses the surrogate classifier’s training set to train a
surrogate classifier.
D Label-Only Attacks Hardness Analysis
Figure 8 shows the accuracy and the fidelity of attacks over
10 hardness groups when the output of target classifier is
only label.
E DenseNet121 Hardness Degree Histograms
Figure 9 shows the hardness degree histograms of samples of
four model extraction attacks on CIFAR10 and CIFAR100
target classifiers. The architecture of target classifiers is
DenseNet121.
F Details of Adversarial Example Attacks
We employ Adversarial Robustness Toolbox (ART)1 and
AutoAttack2 repositories to generate adversarial examples.
Except for attacks’ hyperparameters being mentioned in the
following, we use the default values for the rest of the hy-
perparameters. All attacks generate untargeted adversarial
examples in the white-box setting. The success rates of at-
tacks are presented in Table 8.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [14]: FGSM is a
one-step attack that uses L∞-norm to control the magnitude
of perturbations being added to normal samples. This attack
calculates the gradient of the loss function with respect to the
input and takes one step with size ε in the gradient’s direc-
tion.
x′ = x+ ε.sign(∇xL(θ,x,y)) (12)
We use ε = 0.1 to generate adversarial examples.
Carlini and Wagner (C&W) [6]: Carlini and Wagner
propose an iterative attack to break defensive distillation
1https://github.com/Trusted-AI/adversarial-robustness-toolbox
2https://github.com/fra31/auto-attack
Table 8: Adversarial example attacks success rate.
Attack Success Rate (%)
FGSM C&W PGD AA
CIFAR10 84.3 90.9 100 100
CIFAR100 97.0 97.8 100 100
[43]. They propose three variants of their attack based on
L0, L2, and L∞-norms. In the L2-norm attack, adversarial ex-
amples are generated by minimizing the following equation:
D(x,x+η)+ c.g(x+η)
s.t. x+η ∈ Domain(x)
(13)
where D(x) in L2-norm and g(x) is the objective function.
The authors consider several objective functions and pick
one of them based on the experiments. We use L2-norm vari-
ant to generate adversarial examples in five iterations and use
five binary search steps to select c.
Projected Gradient Decent (PGD) [37]: PGD is an itera-
tive method that improves FGSM to generate more powerful
adversarial examples. In each iteration, PGD takes one step
with size α in the direction of loss function gradient with
respect to the input. It uses projection Πε to restrict the L∞-
norm of perturbation to ε.
xt+1 = Πε(xt +α.sign(∇xL(θ,x,y)) (14)
We use 50 iterations to generate each adversarial example
with α = 3255 and ε =
8
255 .
AutoAttack (AA) [9]: AA using some techniques, such as
step size selection, improves the performance of PGD attack.
AA is a parameter-free attack. We use L∞-norm to restrict
the size of perturbation and ε = 8255 to generate adversarial
examples.
G Detecting Adversarial Example Sequences
Table 9 shows the performance of HODA against four adver-
sarial examples attacks when HODA uses 100 subclassifiers
to calculate the hardness degree of samples. We observed
that when we use hardness degree histograms that have 10
bins rather than 100 bins, the performance of HODA is in-
creased. Hence, although the hardness degree of samples is
in the range [0,99], we divide the hardness degree of samples
by 10 to the number of bins in hardness degree histograms
decreases to 10.
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ft fs: JBDA fs: JBRAND fs: K.Net CIFARX fs: K.Net TIN Correctly Classified by both ft and fs













Figure 8: The accuracy and the fidelity of four model extraction attack surrogate classifiers on both target classifiers CIFAR10
and CIFAR100 over various hardness groups. The test set of each dataset is partitioned into 10 hardness groups so that hardness
group 1 consists of the easiest samples and hardness group 10 consists of the hardest samples. The dashed lines indicate the
percentage of samples being correctly classified by both target classifier ft and surrogate classifier fs. The output of target
classifiers are only labels.






































































Figure 9: The hardness degree histograms of samples of four various model extraction attacks on CIFAR10 and CIFAR100
target classifiers. The budget of model extraction attacks is 50000. The architecture of target classifiers is DenseNet121.
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Table 9: The detection rate and False Positive Rate (PFR)
of HODA against four various adversarial example attacks.
HODA uses 100 subclassifiers to calculate the hardness de-
gree of samples. The FPR indicates the percentage of be-
nign users’ sample sequences that are detected as sample se-
quences of attacks. AE percentage indicates what percentage
of adversaries’ sample sequences are adversarial examples.
Detection Rate of Attacks(%)
AE









10 0.02 0.08 0.2 0.2
25 1.8 11.8 10.4 21.5
50 96.6 99.9 97.1 99.1




10 0.12 0.89 15.35 31.1
25 83.3 99.9 99.9 99.5
50 100 100 100 100










10 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.03
25 3.2 10.6 0.3 0.3
50 74.6 98.8 11.2 13.7




10 2.3 21.6 3.2 1.9
25 94.6 100 97.3 85.7
50 100 100 100 100
100 100 100 100 100
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